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The proportional fairness criterionEvidence shows that a small number of line contingencies in power systems may cause a large-scale
blackout due to the effects of cascading failures. With the development of new technologies and the
growing number of heterogeneous participants, a modern/smart grid should be able to self-heal its inter-
nal disturbances by continually performing self-assessment to deter, detect, respond to and restore from
unpredictable contingencies. Along this line, this research focuses on the problem of how to prevent the
occurrence of cascading failures through load shedding by considering heterogeneous shedding costs of
grid participants. A fair load-shedding algorithm is proposed to solve the problem in a decentralized man-
ner, where a load-shedding participant need only monitor its own operational status and interact with its
neighboring participants. Using an embedded feedback mechanism, the fair load-shedding algorithm can
determine a marginal compensation price for each load-shedding participant in real time based on the
proportional fairness criterion, without knowing the shedding costs of the participants. Such fairly deter-
mined compensations can help motivate loaders/generators to actively participate in the load shedding in
the face of internal disturbances. Finally, the properties of the load-shedding algorithm are evaluated by
carrying out an experimental study on the standard IEEE 30 bus system. The study will offer new insights
into emergency planning and design improvement of self-healing smart grids.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Historical data shows that power systems have suffered from
series of internal and external disturbances leading to various
degrees of blackouts due to the effect of cascading failures
[13,25,11]. An unpredictable blackout may severely affect activities
reliant on electricity, such as railway and air transportation, water
supply and hospital services. For example, during the U.S.-Canada
blackout of August 14, 2003, over 400 transmission lines and 531
generating units tripped and approximately 50 million people were
affected [31]. According to the modern grid initiative conducted by
the National Energy Technology Laboratory of the U.S. Department
of Energy, many types of electrical generation (e.g., distributed
energy resources), storage options [17], advanced metering infra-
structure [12,21], as well as the active participation of consumers
(e.g., demand-response programs), will in future be integrated to
form a huge network of heterogeneous intelligent participants. This
will introduce more rigorous reliability and security requirements
due to the increasing interdependency and complexity of electricelements. In this context, this work is dedicated to tackling the
problem of how to prevent the occurrence of cascading failures
by taking into consideration autonomous behaviors and real-time
interactions of heterogeneous participants in a smart grid.
Current reliability policies in power systems focus mainly on
secure their normal operation under the most severe single or at
most two contingencies, known as the N  1 and N  2 criteria.
Many academic studies have been conducted to impose power bal-
ance by solving various contingency-constrained unit commitment
problems in a centralized manner [20,30]. The results have shown
that, to extend the policy to more tighter criteria (i.e., N  k criteria,
where k > 2) becomes intractable due to the computational bur-
den for the huge number of contingency states i:e:;
Pk
i¼1
N
k
  
.
Along this line, Street et al. [30] have proposed a computationally
efﬁcient framework using robust optimization, which does not
depend on the size of the set of credible contingencies. However,
in their work, the number of contingencies is required as prior
knowledge. Recently, to avoid the computational burden, an
inverse problem have been proposed, that is, to identify a small
group of line contingencies that can trigger a blackout with a cer-
tain level of severity [26,10]. For example, Pinar et al. [26] have
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a combinatorial network inhibition problem. Although the central-
ized optimization approaches adopted by above-mentioned stud-
ies are beneﬁcial to analyze and improve system reliability, they
are practically infeasible to control power ﬂow in real time and
handle multiple and simultaneous contingencies affecting several
parts of a power system [27]. Therefore, it would be desirable to
control power systems in a decentralized manner [33].
As Amin and Schewe [4] argued, a smart grid that automatically
responds to emergencies could reduce the rising number of debil-
itating blackouts. The last few years have witnessed the develop-
ment of new technologies, services and concepts to improve grid
reliability and security in the face of system disturbances. Speciﬁ-
cally, to facilitate the real-time monitoring and control of a grid, a
series of advanced communication infrastructure, modern sensors,
real-time simulation tools, as well as intelligent protection applica-
tions have been introduced. For example, advanced metering infra-
structure, which is a means to facilitate two-way communications,
will let utilities send real-time pricing signals to consumers and
thus encourage consumers to implement direct control of
demand-side management [12]. By doing so, a look-ahead simula-
tion tool may send corrective instructions to control devices in less
than half a second [4]. All these research and development efforts
offer new opportunities for us to systematically design the
‘‘immune system’’ of a smart grid [21], where each individual par-
ticipant continually performs self-assessments to deter, detect,
respond to and restore grid components from unpredictable con-
tingencies, and at the same time optimizing its performance in a
decentralized manner [2,16].
Technically speaking, loads and generation in a smart grid must
ultimately balance in real time to maintain stable. When line con-
tingencies happen, the power ﬂow will be redistributed to other
lines based on the operational conditions of the system. Further,
due to the physical capacity constraint of transmission lines, a
small number of line contingencies may result in overload or fail-
ures in other lines. In this case, it would be necessary to shed some
amount of loads and generation such that the power overload on
other lines can be avoided. Speciﬁcally, this work aims to address
two important issues to prevent the occurrence of cascading fail-
ures. The ﬁrst and most important is to quickly shed a minimum
amount of loads and generation to secure the grid after contingen-
cies happen. This is because both under-shedding and over-shed-
ding may cause unnecessary damages/costs for grid participants.
The second is to make appropriate compensations for heteroge-
neous load-shedding participants. In current power systems, the
compensations are usually determined by pre-signed contracts
[32], which cannot reﬂect the real-time operational status of the
system during the contingencies. As for the increasing number of
active participants in a smart grid, it would be desirable to make
compensation for individual participants by taking into consider-
ation their heterogeneous shedding costs in real time. By doing
so, if the compensations can cover the shedding costs for each indi-
vidual participant, power loaders and generators will be motivated
to participate in the autonomous load shedding process during line
contingencies.
To mathematically formulate the above-mentioned two issues,
this work ﬁrst approximate the complex power ﬂows in a smart
grid using a dc model, i.e., the linearized active power ﬂow model
[14]. Then, the grid is modeled as a directed network, where each
node represents a bus and each edge represents a transmission/
distribution line. By doing so, the load-shedding problem is formu-
lated as a network optimization problem for minimizing the total
shed amount under the power ﬂow constraints. Further, to fairly
compensate load-shedding participants, the concept of load-shed-
ding fairness is introduced based on the criterion of proportional
fairness [29,23].This work presents a fair load-shedding algorithm to solve the
load-shedding problem in a decentralized manner. Based on the
algorithm, each agent representing a loader/generator in a grid
need only monitor the operational situations in their local areas
and interact with their neighboring agents to coordinately deter-
mine the amount of loads/generation they should shed during line
contingencies. From the perspective of grid security, there are two
major steps in the algorithm: the ﬁrst step aims to prevent the con-
tingencies spreading to other lines by shedding a necessary
amount of loads and generation, while the second step aims to
recover as many shed loads/generation as possible to reduce the
total amount of load shedding. From the perspective of load-shed-
ding fairness, an embedded feedback mechanism is involved in the
ﬁrst step to facilitate communications among agents in terms of
load-shedding compensations. Speciﬁcally, a focal loader (or gen-
erator) determines the total amount of compensations based on
compensation requests from its downstream (or upstream) neigh-
bors on the one hand, and adjust its request to its upstream (or
downstream) neighbors on the other hand. During this process,
the focal loader (or generator) does not need to know the exact cost
functions of its downstream/upstream neighbors. By doing so, the
marginal compensation prices for per unit of shed loads/generation
can be collectively and fairly determined by all load-shedding
participants.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
‘Problem statement’, we brieﬂy introduce the dc power ﬂowmodel
and formally formulate the load-shedding problem by taking into
consideration the load-shedding fairness. In Section ‘A decentral-
ized fair load-shedding algorithm’, we present the decentralized
fair load-shedding algorithm associated with an embedded feed-
back mechanism. In Section ‘Experimental results and discussions’,
we validate and demonstrate the properties of the algorithm by
carrying out experimental studies on the standard IEEE 30 bus sys-
tem. Finally, we conclude this paper and list several issues that are
worth to be further pursued in Section ‘Conclusion and future
work’.
Problem statement
In this section, we formally deﬁne the load-shedding problem in
the face of line contingencies and present the issue of load-shed-
ding fairness.
Active power ﬂow model
A power system can be modeled as a directed network GðV ; EÞ,
where each node v i 2 V represents a bus and each edge ekl 2 E rep-
resents a transmission/distribution line from vk to v l. Similar to
existing studies [10,26,8], this work focuses mainly on the active
power ﬂow in GðV ; EÞ, which can be further simpliﬁed to be the
dc power ﬂow model Pkl ¼ bklðhk  hlÞ. Here, hk represents the
phase angle variable at node vk and bkl represents the susceptance
of ekl.
To describe the power ﬂow at the network level, we deﬁne an
arc-node incidence matrix A of GðV ; EÞ with n nodes and m edges.
The ith row represents the ith edge in GðV ; EÞ and the jth column
represents the jth node v j in GðV ; EÞ. Speciﬁcally, each entry
aij 2 A is deﬁned as follows:
aij ¼
1; if the ith edge is an out-edge from v j;
1; if the ith edge is an in-edge to v j;
0; otherwise:
8><
>: ð1Þ
Denote D as a n 1 vector representing the power generation
(i.e., Di > 0) or loads (i.e., Di < 0) on each node. Based on the prop-
erty of ﬂow conservation [19], for each node in GðV ; EÞ, the power
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power ﬂow in GðV ; EÞ can be described as ATBAH D ¼ 0, where
B is an mm diagonal matrix whose entries correspond to line
susceptance (i.e., bkl) andH is an n 1 vector whose entries repre-
sent phase angle variables of corresponding buses. Similar to the
work of Pinar et al. [26], a binary variable ci is adopted to indicate
whether the ith edge is in service or not. If the edge is in service,
ci ¼ 0. Otherwise, if the edge is out of service, ci ¼ 1. By doing so,
the power ﬂow model with line contingencies can be expressed as
ATBCAH D ¼ 0; ð2Þ
where C is an mm diagonal matrix, whose ith entry is 1 ci.
The load-shedding optimization problem
In reality, the power ﬂows on each edge ekl is constrained by its
transmission capacity. When line contingencies happen, some
demand may not be met due to the reduced transmission capabil-
ity of the power grid. In this case, shedding some amount of loads
by cutting off supply to some consumers is necessary to protect the
transmission infrastructures and avoid cascading failures [9]. Fur-
thermore, due to the constraint of load-generation balance, the
same amount of generation should also be reduced by generators.
Denote D as the vector of power generation or loads after the load
shedding, S and L as the set of generator nodes and load nodes,
respectively. Then, the total amount of load shedding can be calcu-
lated as Z ¼Pv i2SðDi  DiÞ ¼Pv j2LðDj  DjÞ.
The load-shedding problem becomes the following network
optimization problem:
min Z ¼
X
i2S
ðDi  DiÞ; ð3Þ
s:t: ATBCAH D ¼ 0; ð4Þ
Pkl 6 lkl;8ekl 2 E; ð5Þ
p=2 6 H 6 p=2: ð6Þ
Here, Eq. (4) represents the power ﬂow constraints under line con-
tingencies. Moreover, the transmission constraint of a system con-
sists of both the physical transmission capacity l of each edge
(i.e., Eq. (5)) and the angular constraint of the power ﬂow model
(i.e., Eq. (6)). Based on the dc power ﬂow model, the power ﬂow
on ekl 2 E is constrained by bklp=2, i.e., Pkl 6 bklp=2. Together
with the physical capacity, we have the transmission constraint
Pkl 6 skl, where skl ¼ minflkl;bklp=2g. Such a constraint will lar-
gely affect the load-shedding results.
A useful property can be given based on the Lemma 1.1 pro-
posed by Bienstock and Verma [10].
Lemma 1. Suppose a power system G is connected after line
contingencies. If the loads and generation are in balance, i.e.,P
v i2VDi ¼ 0, then the Eqs. (4) and (6) determine a unique power
ﬂow on each line.
According to the lemma, if we could maintain the load-genera-
tion balance during the load-shedding process, there must be a
solution for the phase angle hi at each node v i 2 V . Hence, the
load-shedding algorithms in this paper focus mainly on the main-
tenance of the load-generation balance instead of the adjustment
of phase angles.
The load-shedding fairness
After a line contingency happens on eij; j’s downstream loaders
may need to shed some amount of loads to prevent the cascadingfailures. While at the same time, i’s upstream generators need to
reduce the same amount of power generation to maintain the
load-generation balance. Here, we mainly introduce the load shed-
ding of j’s downstream loaders. Suppose that the system will com-
pensate each loader who participate in the load shedding with
respect to the amount of loads it shed. Therefore, the total amount
of compensations will depend on the participated loaders Lp. Since
in reality loaders may evaluate their shedding costs differently, we
use a function CiðxiÞ to represent the cost function of i, where xi
(¼ Di  Di) represents the actual shed loads by i. From a systematic
viewpoint, it would be reasonable to minimize the following
aggregate costs of all participated loaders after a contingency
happens:
min
X
v i2Lp
CiðxiÞ; ð7Þ
s:t:
X
v i2Lp
xi P Pc; ð8Þ
xi P 0: ð9Þ
where Pc is the minimal amount of loads that need to be shed after
the contingency.
One important issue for load shedding among heterogeneous
loaders is the load-shedding fairness among the participated load-
ers. To fairly determine the amount of shed loads among loaders in
Lp, this work utilizes the concept of proportional fairness proposed
in [22,23,29], which is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. A vector of shed loads x ¼ fxi;v i 2 Lpg is proportion-
ally fair if it is feasible, i.e., xP 0, and if for any other feasible
vector x, the aggregate of proportional changes satisﬁes:X
v i2Lp
xi  xi
xi
6 0: ð10Þ
The load-shedding fairness for generators can be deﬁned in a
similar way. Speciﬁcally, this work aims to solve the load-shedding
problem in a decentralized manner, such that (i) the loaders and
generators can respond to unpredictable line contingencies to pre-
vent cascading failures; (ii) the load-generation balance can be
maintained in real time; and (iii) a minimum amount of loads
and generation can be fairly shed by heterogeneous participates.A decentralized fair load-shedding algorithm
In reality, the advanced communication technologies in a smart
grid allows power buses to communicate and interact with each
other to maintain grid reliability. Therefore, in this paper, we
assume that there is an intelligent agent with certain computa-
tional capability located at each node of a given network GðV ; EÞ.
Each agent updates its proﬁle by communicating with its neigh-
bors, and adaptively determines the amount of shed loads or gen-
eration when line contingencies happen.
Agents’ proﬁles
An agent i’s proﬁle consists of two components, i.e., hASi;ALii
and hMUGiðÞ;MULiðÞi, where the ﬁrst component is used to deter-
mine the maximal load shedding that i can conduct and the second
component is used to recover as many loads as possible after con-
tingencies happen. To quickly respond to contingencies happened
anytime and anywhere in a power grid, the agents should monitor
the status of the grid in real time. For a given agent i, we denote ASi
as the available supply that can be reduced by i and its upstream
neighbors, and ALi as the available loads that can be shed by i
and its downstream neighbors. Moreover, we use the notations
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neighbors. Suppose that before the contingencies happen, the grid
is stable, i.e., the power ﬂow satisﬁes transmission constraints on
each edge as well as the ﬂow conservation constraint on each node.
Denote bDi as the power generation (if bDi > 0) and the consumption
(if bDi < 0) by agent i, respectively. Then, the values of ASi and ALi
can be calculated as follows: If i has no upstream neighbors, then
we have ASi ¼ bDi; if i has no downstream neighbors, then we have
ALi ¼ bDi. For other agents (e.g., l), the values of ASl and ALl are
determined by:
ASl ¼ bDl þX
k2Il
Pkl ð11Þ
ALl ¼ bDl X
j2Ol
Plj ð12Þ
where Plk and Plj are determined by the dc power ﬂow model.
Essentially, the tuple of hASi;ALii represents i’s real-time load shed-
ding capability after the contingencies happen.
We further introduce the notion of residual network eGðV ; E0Þ,
which represents the incremental transmission capability of the
network GðV ; EÞ. The node set of eGðV ; E0Þ is the same as that of
GðV ; EÞ. In a residual network, if ekl 2 E, then ekl 2 E0 and its capacity
corresponds to the unused transmission capacity of ekl, i.e.,
~skl ¼ skl  Pkl; If elk 2 E, then ekl 2 E0 and its capacity corresponds
to the used transmission capacity of elk, i.e., ~skl ¼ Plk; Otherwise,
ekl does not belong to E
0. Fig. 1 shows an example of residual net-
work. An augmenting path (e.g., < e12; e23; e34; e46 >2 }16 in Fig. 1)
from i to j in eGðV ; E0Þ is deﬁned as a series of distinct agents con-
necting i and j, where }ij represents the set of augmenting paths
from i to j. If there is at least one augmenting path from k to i ineGðV ; E0Þ, we say that k has access to i (or i is accessible from k).
Denote eDi (¼ Di  bDi) as the unused generation (if eDi > 0) or the
unsatisﬁed loads (if eDi < 0) of agent i. Each agent will remember
both the minimal unused generation (i.e., MUGiðgÞ) for each genera-
tor g that has access to i and the minimal unsatisﬁed loads (i.e.,
MULiðlÞ) for each loader l that has access to i. For each agent i,
the values of MUGiðgÞ and MULiðlÞ can be updated as follows:
MUGiðgÞ ¼ min
eki2eI gi minf~ski;MUGkðgÞg ð13ÞFig. 1. An illustration of a ﬂow network and its residual network. The upper ﬁgure
shows the original network with ﬂow/capacity on each line; the lower ﬁgure shows
its residual network with capacity on each line.MULiðlÞ ¼ min
eji2eI li maxf~sji;MULjðlÞg ð14Þ
where we have eIgi ¼ fkjeki 2 }gig and eIli ¼ fjjeji 2 }lig. Moreover,
MUGgðgÞ ¼ eDg andMULlðlÞ ¼ eDl. HereMUGiðgÞ > 0means that gener-
ator g can supply at least MUGiðgÞ power generation to i’s down-
stream agents through i, while MULiðlÞ < 0 means that l can
consume at lease jMULiðlÞj supply from i’s upstream agents through i.
Suppose a contingency happens on an edge eij, the available
supply of agent j as well as the available loads of agent i will be
directly affected. Accordingly, the AS of j’s downstream agents as
well as AL of i’s upstream agents will also be updated based on
Eqs. (11) and (12). However, the AL of j’s downstream neighbors
and the AS of i’s upstream neighbors will not change after the con-
tingency happens. On the other hand, the network eGðV ; E0Þ will be
updated once the grid reaches a new stable state, i.e., a new load-
generation balance is reached. Consequently, starting from each
loader and generator and then propagating into the networkeGðV ; E0Þ, agents’ MUG and MUL can be updated based on the rules,
i.e., Eqs. (13) and (14).
With respect to load shedding, over-shedding of loads or gener-
ation may cause unnecessary shedding costs. Meanwhile, under-
shedding of loads or generation may fail to prevent the cascading
failures, which may cause tremendous damages. Therefore, the
load-shedding algorithm in this paper complies with the following
two steps:
 Step 1 (Load shedding): The agents coordinate and interact with
their neighbors to fairly reduce the same amount of loads and
generation so as to re-balance the grid.
 Step 2 (Load recovery): The agents gradually recover as much as
generation, and at the same time, maintain the load-generation
balance.
Load shedding using an embedded feedback mechanism
In reality, loaders or generators may evaluate their shedding
costs variously due to different factors such as the operational con-
ditions and the contents of interruptible contracts [6]. Therefore, it
would be helpful to appropriately compensate the potential load-
ers and generators so as to motivate them participate in the load
shedding. In the following, we introduce an embedded feedback
mechanism to determine the load-shedding compensations in real
time based on the proportional fairness criterion, i.e., the optimiza-
tion problem (7)–(9) in Section ‘The load-shedding fairness’.
Decentralized load-shedding fairness
Each agent in the load-shedding algorithm need only communi-
cate with its upstream and downstream neighbors. Suppose a line
contingency happens on eij, an amount of required shed loads Pij
and corresponding compensations will be announced by agent j
to its downstream neighbors in Oj. Then, each of its downstream
neighbors k 2 Oj may request a compensation mk for participating
the load shedding. The compensation mk requested by k consists
of two components: (i) the compensation for itself wk, which is
determined by k’s cost function CkðÞ; and (ii) the compensation
wOk , which is used to compensate the k’s downstream neighbors
who participate in the load shedding.
We ﬁrst introduce how to determine the value of wk 2 Oj. After
receiving all requests from its downstream neighbors, agent j will
determine the compensations for per unit amount of shed loads kj
and allocate shed loads /k ¼ mk=kj ¼ xk þ xOk to k, where xk ¼ wk=kj
and xOk ¼ wOk=kj. Since the compensation wOk will be used to com-
pensate the loads xOk shed by k’s downstream neighbors, the
rational behavior for each k 2 Oj is to shed xk loads and minimize
its own cost by solving the following problem:
Fig. 2. An illustration of the interaction procedure between agent k and a focal agent j in the embedded feedback mechanism for the load-shedding fairness.
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Fig. 3. The relationship between the severity of a line contingency and the amount
of shed loads needed to prevent cascading failures with the factor of safety K ¼ 1:5
on each line. The stair values show the number of overloaded lines caused by a
corresponding line contingency, while the stem values show the amount of shed
loads needed to prevent cascading failures.
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wkP0
Ckðwk=kjÞ wk: ð15Þ
Given kj, the optimal value of wk should satisﬁes: C
0
kðwk=kjÞ ¼ kj,
which is equivalent to
wk ¼ xkC 0kðxkÞ: ð16Þ
This means that k can optimally respond to the allocated shed
loads xk based on its cost function CkðÞ by adjusting its requested
compensation wk to j.
According to the analysis by Kelly [22], to achieve the propor-
tional fairness for allocating shed loads to j’s downstream neigh-
bors, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. If agent j knows the vector m ¼ fmkjk 2 Ojg and attempts to
determine /k by solving the following optimization problem:
min
/kP0
X
k2Oj
mk log/k ð17Þ
s:t:
X
k2Oj
/k P Pij; ð18Þ
then the optimization problem (7)–(9) can be solved so as to achieve
the proportional fairness.
The Lagrangian for the problem (17), (18) is:
Lð/; kjÞ ¼
X
k2Oj
mk log/k þ kj Pij 
X
k2Oj
/k
0
@
1
A: ð19Þ
After eliminating the terms not dependent on kj, the associated
dual problem becomes:
min
kjP0
X
k2Oj
mk log kj  kjPij: ð20Þ
Solving the dual problem, the compensations for per unit
amount of shed loads can be determined as:
kj ¼
X
k2Oj
mk=Pij: ð21Þ
By doing so, agent j does not need to know the exact cost func-
tions of its downstream neighbors to determine the compensations
for per unit shed loads.
An embedded feedback mechanism and its implementation
The above analysis shows that there is an embedded feedback
mechanism for load-shedding fairness at the system level, where
a focal agent (i) determines the marginal compensations for per
unit of shed loads based on the requests from its downstream
neighbors, and at the same time (ii) update its compensationrequest to its upstream neighbor based on the announced per unit
compensation. An illustration of the interaction procedure
between k and j for fair load shedding is shown in Fig. 2. At itera-
tion t, agent k 2 Oj updates its compensation request based on the
allocated shed load from j at the previous iteration, where
wkðtÞ ¼ xkðt  1ÞC0kðxkðt  1ÞÞ. At the same time, k determines the
total shed loads xOk ðt  1Þ to its downstream neighbors and
receives a new request wOk ðtÞ from its downstream neighbors.
Then, a new request mkðtÞ is send to j. After receiving all requests
from its downstream neighbors, j calculates a new compensation
for per unit shed loads kjðtÞ based on Eq. (21). Given kjðtÞ, using gra-
dient projection method, the allocated shed load /kðtÞ can be
updated by
/kðtÞ ¼ /kðt  1Þ þ cðmkðtÞ  kjðtÞ/kðt  1ÞÞ ð22Þ
where c represents the step size for updating. Similar to j; k can
determine the shed loads for each of its downstream neighbor
l 2 Ol, where the difference is that the minimal shed loads becomes
to be xOk ðtÞ. Then, l will update the compensation wl based on the
allocated shed loads xl. For each agent k, the procedure will stop
when the difference /kðtÞ  /kðt  1Þ is less than a threshold j.
Load recovery using the concept of residual network
After the ﬁrst step is completed, a total amount of Pij load and
generation will be fairly shed among a set of load-shedding partic-
ipants. According to Lemma 1, the system reaches a new stable
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work eGðV ; E0Þ is ﬂow dependent, the residual network eGðV ; E0Þ as
well as the values of hMUGiðÞ;MULiðÞi for each agent i, will also
be updated. In the following, we introduce how to recover as many
loads and generation as possible after the ﬁst step of the load-shed-
ding algorithm.
For a generator agent g with eDg > 0, denote MULg ¼
maxlfjMULgðlÞjg as the maximum value of minimal unsatisﬁed
loads from loaders that are accessible from g. The loader agent
lmax can be identiﬁed by g as lmax ¼ argmaxlfjMULgðlÞjg. It means
that lmax can consume at least MULg ¼ jMULgðlmaxÞj power genera-
tion from g. However, g itself can supply eDg ¼ MUGgðgÞ generation.
Therefore, an amount of minfMUGgðgÞ;MULgg generation and loads
will be recovered simultaneously at generator g and lmax. After that,
according to Lemma 1, the power ﬂow and phase angles of the sys-
tem will reach a new stable state. Accordingly, the agents’ proﬁles
will also be updated based on the interaction rules in Section
‘Agents’ proﬁles’. The above process will not terminate until there
is no generator with ðMUGgðgÞ > 0Þ and ðMULg > 0Þ
simultaneously.
Generally, for any generator agent g, if ðMUGgðgÞ > 0Þ
^ðMULg > 0Þ, there is at least a positive amount of
Kg ¼ minfMUGgðgÞ;MULgg power generation can be supplied by g
to lmax. Therefore, at each round, at least a positive amount of shed
loads will be recovered. Based on the decentralized algorithms for
maximum ﬂow problem in networks proposed by Segall [28], the
following lemma shows that after the step 2 of our algorithm, no
more shed loads can be recovered before the failed line resumes
service again.
Lemma 3. If there is no generator g whose proﬁle satisﬁes
ðMUGgðgÞ > 0Þ ^ ðMULg > 0Þ, then no additional loads or generation
can be recovered under the transmission constraint of the grid.
Generally speaking, the load recovery problem is similar to the
maximum ﬂow problem in networks [18], which has been
extended to other problems such as the maximum ﬂow network
interdiction problem [3], and the network inhibition problem
related to the vulnerability of power grids [26]. However, the prob-
lem and algorithm for power grid are unique in terms of the fol-
lowing two aspects:
 Even though we can identify the loader lmax for a generator g to
recover Kg generation and loads simultaneously, we cannot
exactly know which path(s) the recovered power generation
will pass through from g to lmax. However, what we are sure is
that the power can only ﬂow along the paths through which
lmax is accessible from g. The agents’ proﬁles and updating rules
in our algorithms are particularly designed based on such an
observation.Table 1
IEEE 30 Bus system data (buses).
Bus P inject Ang., h Bus P inject
# (net) p:u. rad # (net) p:u
1 0.1750 0.0387 11 0
2 1.0366 0.0390 12 0.4073
3 0.1100 0.0045 13 2.1664
4 0.2815 0.0017 14 0.3536
5 0 0.0469 15 0.3582
6 0 0.0298 16 0.2046
7 1.2878 0.0985 17 0.5022
8 1.8064 0.0842 18 0.1722
9 0 0.0315 19 0.5584
10 0.1638 0.0637 20 0.1105 Since it is hard to predict the quantity of power ﬂow on each
edge before a stable state is reached, we must also prevent
the overload on any edges when we recover the same amount
of generation and loads for g and lmax. The deﬁnition of minimal
unused generation and minimal unsatisﬁed loads make sure
that all paths from g to lmax can afford Kg power ﬂow. By doing
so, no edge will overload during the recovery process.
Moreover, for the security reason, the recovery process must be
implemented in a sequential order. According to the algorithm, the
edge capacity in the residual network will signiﬁcantly affect the
recovery process. In other words, the residual capacity of each edge
plays important roles in recovering loads and generation after the
load shedding. This provides a new angle of view to make reliabil-
ity policies in terms of managing the capacity of transmission lines.Experimental results and discussions
In this section, we demonstrate the properties of the fair load-
shedding algorithm by conducting an experimental study on the
standard IEEE 30 bus system.
The IEEE 30 bus system and parameter settings
The system consists of 30 buses and 41 transmission lines.
There are 6 generators, 6 transmission intermediaries and 18 load-
ers (see Fig. 3 in the work of Donde et al. [15]. To demonstrate the
performance of the fair load-shedding algorithm, we slightly mod-
ify the values of active power injections and phase angles in Table 1
such that there is a natural power ﬂow conservation at each bus.
For the line reactance, we use the same values as described in
the work of Donde et al. [15].
There are four parameters that should be speciﬁed in this paper:
 Line capacity: In practice, the values of line capacity are hard to
obtain and are usually affected by many factors. Based on the
concept of N-resilient grids [7], we consider over-provisioning
of lines capacity by a constant fraction (the factor of safety K)
of the initial power ﬂow, i.e., lkl ¼ K  Pkl. The real power grid
is usually assumed to be at least N-resilient with K ¼ 1:2. In this
paper, we will consider the scenarios with K ¼ 1:2;1:3;1:4 and
1.5, respectively.
 Shedding cost functions: We assume that agents shedding cost
functions have the form CkðxkÞ ¼ C0 þ Ak log xk, where C0 repre-
sents a constant cost and Ak is the available loads/generation to
be shed by k with respect to its corresponding neighbor.
 Updating step size: We set the update size c ¼ 0:2;0:3 and 0.4 to
demonstrate the convergence speed of the fair load-shedding
algorithm.Ang., h Bus P inject Ang., h
. rad # (net) p:u. rad
0.0315 21 0.7671 0.1073
0.2047 22 1.4782 0.1351
0.5080 23 1.2807 0.3332
0.1463 24 0.4166 0.2049
0.1721 25 0 0.3135
0.1041 26 0.1727 0.2479
0.0474 27 2.1604 0.4189
0.0469 28 0 0.0053
0.0047 29 0.1036 0.2985
0.0066 30 0.5211 0.2161
588 B. Shi, J. Liu / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 67 (2015) 582–590 Stop criterion: The threshold j is set to a very small value, i.e.,
j ¼ 1 106.
Results and observations
We ﬁrst investigate the relationship between the severity of a
line contingency and the amount of shed loads needed to prevent
cascading failures. When a line contingency happens, if no load-
shedding algorithm is implemented, the contingency may cause
the overload of other lines and trigger cascading failures. This work
uses the number of overloaded lines caused by a line contingency
to represent its severity. Fig. 3 shows the experimental results for
each line contingency, where the factor of safety K is set to 1.5. The
stair values show the number of overloaded lines caused by a cor-
responding line contingency, while the stem values show the
amount of shed loads needed to prevent cascading failures. Intui-
tively, the less severe a line contingency is, the less loads it may
need to shed. However, it is not the case. It can be observed that7 8 10 17 19 20
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Fig. 5. The convergence speed of our fair load-shedding algorithm with respect to upd
failure of line 28; the right ﬁgure shows the load shedding for the failure of line 36.although lines 10 and 29 can only cause one line to be overload,
the amount of loads needed to shed is more than those that may
cause large number of overloaded lines (e.g., line 36). Actually,
the shed loads depend on the position of the line in the system
as well as the operational conditions of the system in the face of
contingencies, which emphasizes the necessity of the real-time
decentralized load-shedding algorithms. Moreover, some contin-
gencies may cause only small number of overloaded lines at the
earlier stage and suddenly result in a large number of overloaded
lines. For example, the contingency on line 32 can cause the over-
load of lines 20 and 30. However, the failure of line 30 may further
result in at least 8 overloaded lines. Such phenomenon can be ver-
iﬁed by real-world blackouts that small failures trigger the failure
of critical lines and further cause a large-scale blackout [5].
We then focus on demonstrating the properties of our algo-
rithms for different scenarios of line contingencies. Donde et al.
[15] have identiﬁed three transmission lines (i.e., lines 28, 29 and
36) as critical ones in the IEEE 30 bus system, whose removal7 19 20 21
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Fig. 6. An illustration of load recovery processes with respect to different factor of safety K. The left ﬁgure shows the load recovery for the contingency on line 28; the right
ﬁgure shows the load recovery for the contingencies on lines 28 and 36.
Table 2
Load Shedding results for selected line contingencies with the IEEE 30 bus system.
Line ID Load-shedding algorithms Shed loads at each bus (p:u.) Total shedding
Bus 7 Bus 8 Bus 10 Bus 17 Bus 19 Bus 20 Bus 21 (p:u.)
28 Fair 0.0186 0.0635 0.0125 0.0298 0.0114 0.0057 0 0.1415
29 Fair 0.0852 0.1440 0.0772 0.0999 0.0758 0.0470 0.7515 1.2805
36 Fair 0.1447 0.7247 0 0 0 0 0 0.8694
28, 29 Fair 0.1464 0.2136 0.1323 0.1723 0.0506 0.0790 0.7357 1.5297
28, 36 Fair 0.2387 0.8637 0.0091 0.0230 0.0081 0.0099 0 1.1526
29, 36 Fair 0.3029 0.9418 0.0680 0.0907 0.0667 0.0378 0.7423 2.2501
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ments the proposed algorithms for the same line failures and their
combinations. Fig. 4 shows the load-shedding results and marginal
compensation prices for some agents after the ﬁrst step of the fair
load-shedding algorithm for six scenarios of line contingencies,
where the shedding ratio for each loader is calculated by the frac-
tion between actual shed loads and its original loads. The black
bars show the results of an algorithm without considering load-
shedding fairness, while the white bars show the results of the fair
load-shedding algorithm. It can be observed that there are more
participants affording the required shed loads in the fair load-shed-
ding algorithm (e.g., contingencies on Line 28, Line 29, Lines 28 and
29, and Lines 28 and 36). More importantly, the fair load-shedding
algorithm can determine the marginal compensation price k for
each agent based on real-time power ﬂows to achieve load-shed-
ding fairness. For different focal agent in our embedded mecha-
nism, there will be different marginal compensation prices. Based
on the shedding cost functions adopted in our experiments, the
more loads are required to shed, the lower the marginal compen-
sation price will be. (Note that in reality, different loaders may
have different shedding cost functions.) For example, for the line
contingency on line 29 requires to shed all available loads of bus
21, the marginal compensation price k21 is equal to 1. While the
compensation for other agent (e.g., k10) will be larger than 1. In this
case, to achieve the criterion of proportional fairness, more com-
pensations may be needed. Moreover, for different contingency
scenarios, agents may have different marginal compensation
prices. For example, in Fig. 4, the marginal compensation prices
for bus 7 are different for scenarios Line 36 and Lines 28 and 36.
With respect to the convergence speed of the fair load-shedding
algorithm, we carry out simulations for different step sizes, i.e., c ¼
0.2, 0.3 and 0.4. Fig. 5 demonstrates the updating results for contin-
gencies on Line 28 and Line 36, respectively. It can be observed that
the step size can signiﬁcantly affect the convergence speed of the
algorithm. The larger the step size is, the faster the algorithm con-
verges. The results also show that even with different step size, the
algorithm can ﬁnally converge to the same value. That is, therequired loads can be shed successfully. However, we cannot
immoderately use large step size to improve the convergence
speed because our simulations also reveal that if the step size is
too large, the algorithm will not converge any more. In reality,
the step size can be determined based on expert experiences. We
further study how line capacity affects the recovery results (i.e.,
step 2) of our load-shedding algorithms. Fig. 6 demonstrates the
recovery processes for two contingency scenarios (i.e., Line 28,
and Lines 28 and 36) with respect to different factor of safety
K ¼ 1:2;1:3;1:4 and 1.5. The results show that after the contingen-
cies happen, a large mount of loads are shed at the ﬁrst round
based on the ﬁrst step in our algorithm. Subsequently, some load
will be recovered gradually based on the second step in our algo-
rithm. However, due to capacity limitation, not all loads can be
recovered. The larger the line capacity is, the more loads will be
recovered, the less loss the line contingencies will cause. Table 2
shows the ﬁnal results of the fair load-shedding algorithm for six
contingency scenarios with the factor of safety K ¼ 1:5. The ﬁrst
column shows the contingencies happened on different line(s);
the second column shows our load-shedding algorithms; the third
column shows the amount of loads shed at each loader buses; and
the ﬁnal column shows the total amount of shed loads calculated
by corresponding algorithms.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have concentrated on the problem of how to
prevent the occurrence of cascading failures in a smart grid. Differ-
ent from the practical under-voltage load shedding and under-fre-
quency load shedding, we have paid special attention to the
problem of how to shed the loads and generation before cascading
failures happen. Speciﬁcally, the power ﬂow dynamics is approxi-
mated by the dc power ﬂow model. Then, the load-shedding prob-
lem is formulated as a constrained network optimization problem
by taking into consideration the load-shedding fairness. Along this
line, we have presented a decentralized fair load-shedding algo-
rithm with an embedded feedback mechanism to (i) determine
590 B. Shi, J. Liu / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 67 (2015) 582–590the load-shedding compensations in real time based on the propor-
tional fairness criterion, and (ii) minimize the total amount of shed
loads and generation after line contingencies happen. Experimen-
tal studies on the IEEE 30 bus system have been carried out to exhi-
bit the properties and effectiveness of the algorithm.
The decentralized algorithm proposed in this paper may help
gain more insights into the prevention of cascading failures in a
smart grid. However, there are still some issues that are worth to
be considered in the future:
 Although a focal agent in the embedded feedback mechanism
do not need to know the exact shedding costs of each load-
shedding participant, one important issue is how to motivate
the participants to announce compensation requests based on
their real shedding cost functions.
 We have proposed one way to determine the load-shedding
compensations based on the proportional fairness criterion,
however, there may be other realistic ways to determine com-
pensations in real time such as the criterion to reduce the total
load-shedding costs.
 Since it is difﬁcult to obtain the reactance values of transmis-
sion lines in a real-world power system, in this paper, we have
only simulated our algorithms in the IEEE 30 bus system. In the
future, we would apply use our algorithms to analyze and eval-
uate the reliability of real-world power systems, such as the
North American power grid [1,24], by approximately determin-
ing their system parameters.Acknowledgements
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